Army’s Long-Range Fires Modernization Falls Short Without Iterative Development Practices
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released its June 2025 report titled Army Modernization: Leading Practices Could Better Support Delivery of Artillery and Missiles (GAO-25-107263), analyzing the Army’s progress in modernizing long-range fires systems. The report outlines the Army's transition from counterinsurgency operations to preparing for large-scale combat against near-peer adversaries. This shift has accelerated the urgency for modernizing artillery, rockets, and missile systems—particularly the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA), Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), Mid-Range Capability (MRC), and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW).
The Army identified four key capability gaps: range, lethality, mobility, and survivability. Each of the four signature systems was developed to close these gaps. However, the GAO found that the Army’s success in fielding these capabilities has been mixed. ERCA was ultimately terminated due to technological immaturity, while PrSM, MRC, and LRHW experienced development successes tempered by delays, production shortfalls, and in some cases, limited application of proven development practices.
At the core of GAO’s critique is the Army’s inconsistent use of “iterative product development,” a method championed by leading private-sector companies for complex systems. Iterative practices involve continuously evaluating business cases, incorporating stakeholder feedback, defining and evolving a minimum viable product, and utilizing digital engineering tools like digital twins and digital threads. These tools support adaptive and efficient development—especially crucial for modern, multifaceted weapons systems.
ERCA, for instance, employed a linear approach and pressed forward despite repeated test failures. The Army invested nearly $1 billion before ending the program, failing to adjust the business case even as technical challenges mounted. In contrast, MRC and LRHW demonstrated more iterative features, such as flexibility in requirements, stakeholder feedback loops, and limited use of digital modeling. Still, neither program fully embraced modern digital engineering practices, limiting their potential for speed and cost-effectiveness.
PrSM, while progressing in production and testing, also followed a largely linear development path. Its four planned increments represent stepwise improvements with fixed requirements, rather than an adaptive design process. Though the Army did use digital models to simulate missile performance, GAO emphasized that these were static tools, not full digital twins. Digital twins—real-time, data-rich virtual models—could offer real efficiencies in testing, refinement, and sustainment planning. The absence of a program-wide digital thread—a shared, authoritative source of system data across a product’s lifecycle—further hindered holistic program integration.
In response, GAO issued three formal recommendations to the Secretary of the Army: (1) future self-propelled howitzer efforts should incorporate continuous business case evaluations; (2) the PrSM program should assess the feasibility of iterative development practices including digital tools; and (3) the MRC program should explore how digital threads and twins could support future capability upgrades.
This GAO report provides a clear directive: while the Army is investing heavily to prepare for the battlefield of the future, success hinges on adopting industry-proven iterative development and engineering practices. Without such methods, the risk of underperformance, cost overruns, and delayed fielding remains high—jeopardizing both mission effectiveness and soldier readiness.
Disclaimer:
This blog post summarizes the publicly available GAO report GAO-25-107263. It is provided for informational purposes only and does not guarantee accuracy or constitute legal advice.
