Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs) Under DFARS 212.70: What Contractors Should Know
A commercial solutions opening (CSO) is a DoD acquisition mechanism designed to shorten the path between a validated need and a contract award for commercial products and commercial services. Under DFARS subpart 212.70, contracting officers can issue a “general solicitation” describing either a specific program requirement or a broader area of interest, then select among submitted solutions using a subject-matter expert peer review process rather than the more formal comparative evaluation paradigms associated with FAR part 15 competitions. The core idea is to invite industry to propose “how” to solve a capability problem—often with multiple plausible technical approaches—while allowing the Government to move faster and focus evaluation on technical merit and mission relevance. (Acquisition.gov)
The statutory foundation for CSOs sits in 10 U.S.C. § 3458, which authorizes the Department of Defense and the military departments to acquire (historically) innovative commercial products and innovative commercial services through competitive selection of proposals received under a general solicitation and reviewed through peer review (and, as appropriate, other forms of expert review). The statute also clarifies that using these general solicitation competitive procedures counts as “competitive procedures” for purposes of DoD’s competition requirements, which matters for protest risk posture and for downstream decisions that depend on whether an action was competed. (U.S. Code)
DFARS 212.70 operationalizes this authority with several contractor-relevant design choices. First, CSOs are limited to scenarios where the Government seeks innovative solutions, capability-gap closure, or potential technological advancement, and where the Government expects to see meaningful variation among technical or scientific approaches. This “variation” criterion is not window dressing; it is the justification for why a peer-review, solution-centric intake mechanism is appropriate in the first place. DFARS also defines “innovative” in a way that is broader than “brand new invention”: it includes new technologies and also new applications of existing technologies as of the proposal submission date. (Acquisition.gov)
Second, CSO awards are constrained to fixed-price types (including fixed-price incentive contracts). DFARS makes this mandatory “notwithstanding FAR 12.207,” and the statute similarly embeds the fixed-price limitation. For contractors, this is a major economic signal: whatever speed and flexibility CSOs create on the front end, the back end is still governed by fixed-price risk allocation, which pushes offerors to do serious cost realism work internally even when the Government is not conducting a traditional cost evaluation. (Acquisition.gov)
Third, DFARS requires the Government to treat products and services acquired through a CSO as commercial products or commercial services. Practically, that treatment affects clause sets, intellectual property/data-rights postures, and the general expectation that solutions should be anchored in commercial practice (or readily adaptable commercial practice). DFARS also explicitly permits use of CSOs for research and development, in conjunction with FAR part 35 and DFARS part 235, and notes that CSOs are not subject to the limitations that otherwise apply to certain R&D solicitations—an important nuance for dual-use tech firms that might assume “commercial = not R&D.” (Acquisition.gov)
Fourth, DFARS prescribes what must be in the CSO notice: the Government’s interest, any technical data needed to meet minimum requirements, the evaluation factors, the proposal acceptance window, and submission instructions. Technical and mission importance must be the primary evaluation factors. Price is evaluated “to the extent appropriate,” but at minimum to determine the price is fair and reasonable. This is a materially different emphasis than many best-value source selections, and it rewards contractors that can translate technical differentiation into mission outcomes and deliverability, with pricing that is credible and explainable without relying on the structure of FAR part 15 discussions.
Process mechanics also matter. DFARS requires publicizing the CSO through the Governmentwide point of entry (e.g., SAM.gov) and publishing at least annually, and it removes the usual requirement to synopsize each individual proposed contract action under FAR subpart 5.2 because the annual CSO notice serves that function. In addition, proposals do not need to be evaluated against each other because they are not necessarily responding to a common statement of work; they can be evaluated on their own merits against the published factors. Contractors should read this as an invitation to submit strong, self-contained packages that anticipate technical reviewer questions and de-risk execution, because the peer review report becomes the contemporaneous record supporting the selection.
Two high-impact limitations should shape capture strategy. For awards over $100 million, both the DFARS and the statute impose additional approval and congressional notification mechanics, including a written determination by senior acquisition leadership before awarding and post-award notification to congressional defense committees. That reality can elongate timelines for very large efforts, even if the front-end solicitation is streamlined.
Finally, contractors should track a significant policy trajectory: the FY2026 NDAA (Public Law 119-60, enacted December 18, 2025) is widely reported as expanding CSO utility beyond “innovative” commercial solutions toward broader coverage of commercial products and services, and as creating additional follow-on production authorities in certain circumstances. Because codification can lag, treat this as a live-change area and verify the current statutory text and DFARS updates when planning a CSO pipeline.
Disclaimer: This post is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. CSO authorities and implementing regulations can change (including through NDAA amendments and DFARS rulemaking), and outcomes depend heavily on solicitation-specific terms and facts; contractors should consult qualified counsel for advice on a particular procurement.