Slowing the Pace of Innovation: GAO Calls on DOD to Reboot Weapon System Acquisition

In its 23rd annual report to Congress on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly weapon systems, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) presents a sobering assessment of persistent inefficiencies and missed opportunities across a portfolio projected to cost nearly $2.4 trillion. The June 2025 report, GAO-25-107569: Weapon Systems Annual Assessment – DOD Leaders Should Ensure That Newer Programs Are Structured for Speed and Innovation, warns that without structural changes and a renewed commitment to modern acquisition practices, DOD risks delivering underperforming and delayed systems to the warfighter—often at significantly higher costs.

GAO’s findings indicate that DOD continues to struggle with cost growth, schedule delays, and underutilization of modern development practices. Among the most striking revelations is that 30 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) assessed in both this and the previous report experienced a collective $49.3 billion increase in estimated costs. Notably, the U.S. Air Force’s Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program alone accounted for over $36 billion of that total. These rising costs are not being matched by timely results; the average time from MDAP initiation to initial operational capability has now ballooned to nearly 12 years—an increase of 18 months from the prior year. This includes MDAPs that initially entered through the Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) pathway, a route explicitly designed for speed.

The report underscores that the very tools DOD created to move faster—like the MTA pathway—are often misused. GAO found that several programs using the MTA approach began development with immature technologies, which led to elongated development periods that contradicted the intent of the pathway. For example, none of the seven former MTA programs GAO reviewed were ready for production or fielding at the conclusion of their efforts.

Beyond analyzing delays and cost overruns, GAO evaluated DOD’s implementation of “leading practices” for product development. These include establishing a minimum viable product, utilizing digital twinning and digital threads, and adopting modular open systems approaches (MOSA). Although modularity is becoming more common—driven in part by statutory requirements—few programs are using these best practices holistically or iteratively. Most programs reviewed do not combine modern tools and processes to achieve the compounding benefits they offer when implemented together.

Equally concerning, the report finds that future weapon system acquisitions are not positioned to fare any better. Programs that have yet to fully initiate continue to report planning levels of leading practice adoption that are at or below current underperforming programs. GAO attributes this in part to insufficient leadership action: while DOD’s written strategies frequently emphasize speed and innovation, actual policy and enforcement mechanisms lag behind. For instance, while the 2024 updates to the MTA policy included clarifications and guidance, they still failed to implement key elements of modern product development.

Software development continues to be another area of chronic underperformance. Despite issuing new policies and strategies, many DOD programs have not transitioned to Agile or DevSecOps frameworks or implemented robust user engagement models. GAO’s past recommendations for including Agile metrics and user agreements remain only partially adopted across the department. Moreover, cybersecurity evaluations and zero-trust strategies are still inconsistently implemented, raising concerns about system resilience and operational integrity.

The report concludes with a set of forward-looking recommendations. Chief among them is a call for DOD leadership to ensure that newer acquisition programs incorporate leading development practices from the very start—before formal initiation. GAO emphasizes that early adoption of these practices is key to avoiding the rigid requirements, budget traps, and outdated development methods that have plagued the department for decades.

In testimony to the enduring nature of these issues, GAO’s Comptroller General Gene Dodaro reflects on 15 years of similar findings, warning that without tangible changes, DOD risks ceding technological advantage to adversaries who are already capitalizing on faster, more agile development models. The time to act, the report implies, is long overdue.

Disclaimer: This summary is based on GAO-25-107569 and is intended for informational purposes only. It is not guaranteed to be accurate, complete, or up-to-date and does not constitute legal or professional advice. Please consult the original GAO report for official guidance: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107569.