The Contracting Officer’s Justification and Approval: Purpose, Preparation, and Practical Use

In the federal acquisition system, few documents are as consequential—and as misunderstood outside the profession—as the Justification and Approval for Other Than Full and Open Competition, commonly shortened to “J&A.” At its core, the J&A is the formal, written rationale for departing from the default rule of full and open competition. It operates as both a shield and a compass: a shield that protects a procurement from challenge when circumstances legitimately preclude competition, and a compass that points the acquisition team back toward competition as soon as those circumstances abate. Understanding what a J&A is, when it is required, how it is constructed, and how it is used in practice is essential professional knowledge for contracting officers.

The statutory and regulatory backdrop begins with the Competition in Contracting Act and its implementation in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 6. Full and open competition is the baseline. A J&A is triggered when a contracting officer intends to use one of the enumerated exceptions to that baseline under FAR 6.302, such as situations in which only one responsible source can meet the government’s needs, when unusual and compelling urgency prevents the delays of competition, when national security considerations limit disclosure, or when an international agreement or statute expressly authorizes a noncompetitive path. Closely related constructs exist outside Part 6 and are often conflated with J&As. Multiple-award IDIQ orders that bypass fair opportunity require a justification under FAR 16.505(b)(2), colloquially called a “JEFO.” Purchases under the Federal Supply Schedules may use a limited-sources justification under FAR 8.405-6. And for simplified acquisitions of commercial products and services, FAR 13.501 prescribes a separate sole-source justification. Each instrument serves a similar function—documenting why the government is not competing a particular action—but each has its own authority, content, approval levels, and posting rules. A competent contracting officer knows which lane applies and keeps the analysis anchored in the correct citation.

A J&A does not exist in a vacuum; it is integrated with the acquisition plan and market research. The contracting officer’s first task is determining whether the contemplated exception truly applies, a judgment grounded in facts obtained from the program office, end users, technical staff, and any prior industry outreach. The threshold question is rarely “Can I write a J&A?” but rather “Do the facts support a temporary and narrowly tailored departure from competition?” If the answer is yes, the officer structures the strategy to secure approvals before award and to minimize the scope and duration of the exception. Even in urgency scenarios where award must proceed swiftly, the officer documents the basis contemporaneously and completes approvals at the earliest permissible point. The discipline here is critical: the timing of approvals, the precision of the scope, and the alignment with market reality are common grounds on which protests and internal reviews scrutinize J&As.

Drafting the J&A is both technical writing and evidence-based advocacy. FAR 6.303-2 prescribes the content, and following that roadmap yields a sturdy document. The narrative identifies the agency and contracting activity; describes the supplies or services with enough specificity to illuminate why alternatives do not work; cites the precise authority under FAR 6.302; and, most importantly, marshals the facts that support that authority. This is where market research must move beyond generalities. Cataloging the RFI or sources-sought responses, mapping compatibility or data rights constraints, explaining qualification or certification barriers, or documenting lead-time realities in a genuine surge scenario—all of these details convert a conclusory statement into a persuasive justification. The J&A should also explain the price reasonableness strategy, whether through prior paid prices, commercial catalogs, independent government estimates, data other than certified cost or pricing, or a defined negotiation plan, because the absence of competition heightens the burden to demonstrate that the government is paying a fair and reasonable price.

A well-crafted J&A addresses the present while planning for the future. FAR requires agencies to describe actions to remove barriers to competition, and this is far more than a perfunctory sentence. Contracting officers can and should document affirmative steps such as pursuing data rights or open interfaces to avoid technical lock-in, establishing second-source qualification programs, segmenting requirements to enable partial competition, or publishing advance notices to industry to develop alternatives. By articulating concrete measures and timelines, the J&A becomes a tool for market-shaping rather than a mere file artifact, and it signals to oversight reviewers that the exception is not a permanent retreat from competition.

Governance and approvals are integral to the J&A’s credibility. Approval thresholds scale with dollar value: lower-dollar actions may be approved at the contracting officer level, mid-range justifications typically require the competition advocate or head of the contracting activity, and very high-dollar actions elevate to the senior procurement executive or agency head. Agency supplements may add legal review requirements or additional signatories, and prudent officers route early drafts to counsel to ensure the factual theory matches the correct legal authority. Once approved, the government generally must post a redacted copy to the public procurement portal within set timelines after award, with longer posting windows for urgency and exceptions for classified or proprietary details. This transparency requirement disciplines the analysis and provides industry insight into the government’s rationale.

Using the J&A effectively in practice involves more than filling in headings. The contracting officer’s role is to bind the justification tightly to the minimum needed to satisfy the mission at hand. Over-broad scopes, unnecessary brand-name restrictions, or long durations invite avoidable risk. Similarly, weak market research—such as relying solely on a quick web search or failing to engage potential sources—undermines the justification even when the underlying need is legitimate. When a brand-name specification appears necessary, officers should examine whether a brand-name-or-equal description or performance-based requirement could achieve the need while reopening competition. When the issue is schedule, officers should parse whether portions of the requirement can be competed while a narrow urgent tranche proceeds noncompetitively. These are not merely drafting choices; they are strategic decisions that affect supplier ecosystems and long-term cost.

Distinguishing among J&A-adjacent instruments is likewise a hallmark of professional practice. Under multiple-award IDIQ vehicles, for example, a fair-opportunity exception justification under FAR 16.505(b)(2) must track one of the enumerated exceptions and meet that subpart’s approval and posting rules; importing FAR Part 6 language can create confusion or misalignment. For schedule orders under FAR Subpart 8.4, the limited-sources justification has its own required elements and is grounded in the ordering procedures of that program. And for simplified acquisitions of commercial products and services, the streamlined sole-source justification under FAR 13.501 reflects Congress’s and the FAR Council’s policy choices about transaction costs at lower dollar values. Contracting officers who keep these frameworks cleanly separated will draft faster, withstand reviews more easily, and avoid procedural missteps that can delay awards.

The life of a J&A does not end at signature and posting. Because it authorizes a deviation from competition, it should be actively referenced during negotiations and award to confirm that the contract line items, period of performance, and pricing align with what was justified. Any material expansion of scope, increase in ceiling, or extension of time requires reassessment and, at times, a revised or supplemental justification. Post-award, the acquisition team should execute the competition-restoration actions promised in the document and track them with the same rigor as other acquisition milestones. In this way, the J&A fosters accountability: it is both a permission slip and a promise.

Finally, it bears emphasis that a strong J&A is no substitute for good supplier engagement. When market dynamics, data rights, or interoperability issues limit competition, early and transparent communication with industry about the government’s path back to competition can catalyze innovation and reduce future dependence on sole sources. Thoughtful advance planning, technical road-mapping, and pilot efforts can shorten the period during which a J&A is necessary, while preserving mission continuity when it truly is.

For contracting officers, then, the J&A is not simply a compliance checkpoint. It is a disciplined, evidence-based narrative that protects the government’s interests when competition is not practicable and helps restore competition as soon as it is. Mastery of its authorities, content, approvals, and strategic use is a professional competency that elevates both the quality and defensibility of federal procurements.

Disclaimer: This article is provided for informational purposes only and reflects a good-faith effort to summarize federal acquisition rules. It may not reflect the most current legal or regulatory developments and is not legal advice. Readers should consult their agency counsel or qualified advisors for guidance on specific matters.