Helping the J&A Without Crossing the Line: How Federal Contractors Can Support a Contracting Officer’s Justification

For most federal contractors, the Justification and Approval for Other Than Full and Open Competition (J&A) is something they encounter after the fact: a redacted narrative posted post-award that explains why competition was limited on a given action. Because the J&A is the government’s document, signed and defended by government officials under the Competition in Contracting Act and FAR Part 6, direct influence by a vendor is both limited and inappropriate. Yet it does not follow that contractors are powerless. By structuring their market engagement, technical disclosures, data-rights posture, and pricing evidence with discipline, contractors can materially assist a contracting officer’s ability to write an accurate, defensible J&A when one is warranted—and shorten the time before full competition is restored.

The practical entry point is market research. Sources sought notices, RFIs, and industry days are not mere formalities; they are the evidentiary record that later supports or refutes claims of “only one responsible source,” unusual and compelling urgency, or interoperability constraints. Submitting a perfunctory capability statement rarely helps. What assists a contracting officer is specific, verifiable information that maps directly to the government’s stated outcomes: demonstrated performance thresholds, tested interfaces, cybersecurity and facility clearances, qualification or certification status, lead times for long-cycle components, and concrete onboarding timelines. When a contractor contends that only its solution can meet the need, it should walk the government through the technical logic with artifact-level proof—interface control documents, standards mappings, validation reports—rather than relying on conclusory assertions. Conversely, when multiple sources exist, vendors can still help the government document the boundaries of feasible competition by identifying which portions of a requirement are truly interchangeable and which depend on proprietary elements, thereby encouraging narrowly tailored scopes if a noncompetitive tranche is unavoidable.

Data rights and interoperability posture are equally consequential. Many J&As hinge on the claim that alternative sources cannot meet the requirement without access to proprietary data, tooling, or interfaces. Contractors who anticipate recurring procurements can reduce the government’s reliance on sole-source justifications by offering modular architectures, open or published interfaces, and license terms that permit second-source qualification where feasible. Even when exclusive rights are necessary, pre-negotiated rights in technical data, escrow arrangements, or interface documentation can help a contracting officer articulate a credible plan to restore competition—an element required in J&As and closely read by oversight. Framed correctly, these commitments are not self-defeating; they signal maturity and often increase a vendor’s credibility when a time-bounded, noncompetitive action is justified.

Price reasonableness is another frequent weak point. Because the absence of competition heightens scrutiny, a contracting officer benefits from contemporaneous, audit-ready price support. Contractors can pre-stage robust commercial catalog evidence, historical paid prices adjusted for quantity and inflation, cost drivers tied to market indices, and learning-curve analyses that explain step-down pricing over time. When urgency drives the action, vendors who transparently separate surge premiums from steady-state rates and outline a path to normalize pricing give the government a defensible narrative. This discipline also pays dividends under multiple-award IDIQs and Federal Supply Schedule orders, where exceptions to fair opportunity or limited-sources justifications follow parallel logic even outside FAR Part 6.

Timing matters. Where an agency faces a looming gap, contractors can propose bridging constructs that are tightly bounded in scope and duration, paired with an executable competition plan. Offering a short-term maintenance tranche while a fully competitive recompete proceeds, or segmenting a requirement so that only the truly non-severable, interoperability-bound elements remain sole-source, helps a contracting officer justify the minimum departure from competition. Providing realistic supply chain lead times and qualification schedules—grounded in supplier letters or past performance—prevents overbroad or open-ended justifications that are vulnerable to challenge.

Ethics and transparency also govern this space. Contractors should avoid back-channel advocacy on draft J&As and instead use sanctioned forums: pre-solicitation engagement, Q&As, and written responses to public notices. Where proprietary details are necessary for the government’s record, vendors can facilitate appropriate NDAs and mark submissions carefully so that later public posting can be properly redacted without impairing the evidentiary core. Reviewing the government’s draft statements of work and suggesting performance-based, brand-name-or-equal specifications—supported by testable acceptance criteria—often reduces the need for brand-name justifications altogether.

Finally, contractors can help the government keep its promise to restore competition. Post-award, executing the technical roadmap offered during market research—publishing interface documentation on agreed timelines, participating in qualification pilots for second sources, or modularizing future releases—gives the contracting officer concrete progress to cite in subsequent updates. That posture not only shortens the government’s reliance on J&As but also positions the incumbent as a partner in stewarding competitive markets, a stance that resonates with competition advocates and senior procurement executives who must approve high-dollar noncompetitive actions.

None of these measures guarantee a particular outcome, and they do not convert a vendor into a co-author of a government justification. But they do improve the factual record on which a contracting officer must rely, narrow the scope and duration of any noncompetitive action, and build the kind of defensible narrative—technical, commercial, and temporal—that withstands oversight. In a system that prizes competition, the most durable way to “influence” a J&A is to make it unnecessary or, when necessary, to make it precise, short, and well-supported.

Disclaimer: This post is for informational purposes only and reflects a good-faith summary of acquisition practices. It may not reflect the most current legal or regulatory developments and does not constitute legal advice. Contractors and agencies should consult counsel for guidance on specific procurements.